If you enable --privileged just to get CAP_SYS_ADMIN for nested process isolation, you have added one layer (nested process visibility) while removing several others (seccomp, all capability restrictions, device isolation). The net effect is arguably weaker isolation than a standard unprivileged container. This is a real trade-off that shows up in production. The ideal solutions are either to grant only the specific capability needed instead of all of them, or to use a different isolation approach entirely that does not require host-level privileges.
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I'm building an 80386-compatible core in SystemVerilog and blogging the process. In the previous post, we looked at how the 386 reuses one barrel shifter for all shift and rotate instructions. This time we move from real mode to protected and talk about protection.